Anyone a fan of feminist philosophy? Here, geek out with me!
A general agreement is apparent across disciplines including feminism, that rationalist values are currently in a state of crisis (Lloyd, 1996). As rationality or reason has been long associated with masculinity and male power, it has been used to maintain an oppressive status quo and is therefore a central focus of interest in feminist epistemology (Lloyd, 1996). Feminist theorists contend that there is a gendered or ‘sexually specific’ way of knowing, i.e., there is such a thing as women’s way as well as men’s way of knowing. One of the strategies to get this viewpoint widely accepted is to have the body recognized and established as a valid source of knowledge (Grosz, 1993). Establishing a women’s ‘right to know’ separate from the presumptions that regulate patriarchal structures of knowledge would mean that the dominance that masculinity has held over rationalist values and knowledges could be weakened (Grosz, 1993).
The Crisis of Reason
What is this crisis of reason everyone is concerned about? What worried 17th century philosopher Descartes was that knowledge lacked secure foundations (Grosz, 1993; Lloyd, 1996). He claimed that an unstable foundation of knowledge would cause any intellectual workings built upon it to be questionable (Grosz, 1993). According to contemporary empiricists such as Foucault, the crisis of reason is loosely defined as the friction between objectivity and subjectivity (Grosz, 1993). Elizabeth Grosz (1993), gives a more refined definition stating, “It is a crisis of self validation and methodological self-justification, formulated in different terms within different disciplines and periods; a crisis of reason’s inability to rationally know itself; a crisis posed as reason’s inability to come outside itself, to enclose and know itself from the outside: the inadequation of the subject and its other”. Here is a list of some of the assumptions that have been brought into question at this time of crisis:
1) The transparency and neutrality of methods used in the pursuit of knowledge is problematic. The methodologies currently used in the sciences and humanities, which frequently use instrumentation, do not necessarily adequately and realistically represent their subject.
2) There is a substantial disconnect between disciplines. There is too much of a lack of consensus of where knowledge comes from—whether it is a product of ‘man’s’ interior or exterior (E.g. psychology vs. sociology).
3) There is a problem with the presumption that the object of knowledge is independent and outside knowledge of it—creating truth that is invulnerable to invalidation.
4) The assumption of the atemporal and transgeographic value and validity of knowledge. Can knowledge transcend time and place? Once a knowledge is produced, will it be forever valuable? Can a knowledge be consistently valuable to a particular geographic area in that it was produced?
5) Although knowledge is produced by individuals, it must be knowable everyone. Knowledge is perspectiveless, a view that creates conflict when attempting to study particular populations such as women or minority groups (Grosz, 1993).
Overall, the philosophy that knowledge is external to the object of knowledge is a major antagonist in the crisis of reason and a popular target of feminist criticism.
Conceptions of the Body
Feminism and the body.
Feminist theory argues that our bodies are a way of knowing and letting the body go unacknowledged as a source of knowledge will allow the body to remain subordinate to ‘male’ reason (Grosz, 1993). Since women menstruate, give birth and are objectified as man’s sexual playthings, they have been and are still associated with the body. The traditional philosophers did not see themselves as men; they did not associate their bodies with maleness, they saw themselves as brains (e.g. ‘brain in a vat’ concept) and superior to women. To the traditional philosophers bodies were irrelevant. It is argued that this way of thinking gave rise to the long-standing view that knowledge is external to the object of knowledge.
Acknowledging the body as a source of knowledge would suggest that there is a woman’s way of knowing and this thought threatens male superiority and is incongruent with the philosophy that knowledge is only knowledge when everyone can know it. The way to challenge this view and have bodies and ultimately individuals recognized and accepted as sources of knowledge, we have to dismantle masculine reason.
The body as a surface of inscription.
Here are two approaches to theorizing the body. The first approach, the ‘inscriptive’ model, originates from the works of Nietzche, Kafka, Foucault and Deleuze (Grosz, 1993). The second, the ‘lived body’ model has its origins in psychoanalysis and phenomenology (Grosz, 1993). The first theory can be considered sociopolitical. The inscriptive model, as Grosz (1993) states, is attentive to the “processes by which the body is marked, scarred, transformed, and written upon or constructed by the various regimes of institutional, discursive, and nondiscursive power as a particular kind of body”. According to Grosz (1993) altering the body is a way to gain social prominence and power. Bodies become signs and silently relay knowledge to others and evaluate incoming knowledge (Grosz, 1993). Ways in which one can alter the body include but are not limited to: piercing, tattoos, clothing, make-up, jewelry, as well as surgery, dieting and exercise. Extensions of the self such as cars, living spaces and jobs are also looked at in this model.
The body as the locus of lived experience.
The second model, the ‘lived body’ is the body’s ‘internal’ or ‘psychic’ inscription (Grosz, 1993). Where the first model is concerned with the external experience of the body, this second model focuses on the internal; how the body is experienced by its owner (Grosz, 1993). If we were to accept the lived body or the body’s innateness, we would be able to ask more questions about why people do the things they do. Usually feminists don’t talk about innateness as it allows excuses to be made to oppress women. However, we need take the innate body as real.
Relations Between Feminist Theory, Bodies and Knowledges
Feminism is committed to the project of knowing women, making women objects of knowledge (Grosz, 1993; Lloyd, 1996). There are feminists who critique the prevailing masculine norms and fill in the blanks in areas where women have been absent, and there are feminists who develop new forms and methods altogether that are sexually different from male paradigms (Grosz, 1993). Focussing on supplemental knowledge is problematic but assigning women to the position of the knower and hence the subject of knowledge, is empowering and more conducive to a paradigm shift.
In conclusion, traditional research methodologies reflect a dominant, ‘masculine’ way of knowing—a way of knowing, which, in its ‘neutrality’, rejects all forms of corporeality; subjugating the sexual specificity of knowledges produced (Grosz, 1993). This current process of obtaining and evaluating knowledge is not only inadequate it is oppressive to women (Grosz, 1993; Lloyd, 1996). We must account for the reality of biology and accept the body as a valuable source and evaluator of knowledge (Grosz, 1993). In doing so, and establishing a women’s ‘right to know’ separate from the presumptions that regulate patriarchal structures of knowledge, could lead to a ‘reform’ of reason—so that women (and their bodies) will no longer be treated as irrational, incompetent, passive and dependent (Grosz, 1993). I believe that establishing women’s bodies as sources and evaluators of knowledge would also lead to paradigm shifts concerning female sexuality and rape. Imagine the dismantling of rape myths and the madonna/whore and predator/prey paradigms that make rape so easy to get away with. I truly believe that if we could reform reason and get bodies as sources of knowledge recognized, it would be a catalyst of epic proportions—ultimately leading to a better and safer world for women to live in.
References
Grosz, E. (1993) Bodies and Knowledges: Feminism and the Crisis of Reason. In L.
Alcoff & E. Potter (Eds.) Feminist Epistemologies (pp. 187-216). New York:
Routledge.
Lloyd, G. (1996). The man of reason. In A. Garry & M. Pearsall (Eds.) Women,
knowledge and reality: Explorations in feminist philosophy (pp. 149-165). New
York and London: Routledge.
